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Abstract
The paper shows that politically motivated interventions in the financial market in
the form of bailing out borrowing firms reduce banks’ incentives to gather valuable
information about firms’ projects. This loss of information is a hidden cost which
adversely affects firm value. Firms invest resources and pay a premium to politically
connected persons (BOD or other personnel). Such connections serve the twin pur-
poses of hedging and enhancement of the value of collateral pledged against bank
loans. Feeling secured, banks lose incentives to monitor borrowing firms. Thus,
wealth effect of bailout from political connection is partially offset by the losses of
valuable information brought about by bank lending. In equilibrium, the trade-off
from gains out of political connections and costs due to losses from information-
based bank monitoring depend on (i) the country’s disclosure laws, (ii) the political
environment, (iii) the premium paid to form connections, and (iv) the state of the
economy.
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1. Introduction
A large volume of empirical literature has revealed the pervasive use of political
connections by firms across many countries as a means of obtaining favours and
economic gains from the state. See, ??????? among others, for extensive discussion
of this phenomenon in diverse economic and financial environments. Earlier studies
in this area focused on corruption and rent seeking activities of such connected firms
in generic cases (See ? and ?). Recent studies further underscore the importance
of financial markets in facilitating such connections between the concerned parties -
namely, firms, banks, and politicians. These studies reveal that firms utilize resources
to nurture political connections which enable them to secure loans on concessionary
terms, default without many penalties and even extract a bailout in the event of
financial distress. A large number of these papers show the existence of direct links
between politicians and key personnel such as CEOs and members of the board
of many firms1. Also, firms often contribute funds to political parties contesting
elections. In return they receive multiple direct and indirect favours from banks and
financial institutions in many countries. See ?????????; for country-specific studies
on multiple dimensions relating political connections of firms to banks and financial
markets2.
The literature has certainly enriched our understanding of the subject by pre-
senting substantial body of evidence of political links and their modus operandi.
However, it is also a fact that not all firms are politically connected as such connec-
tions - although they bring benefits also impose direct and indirect costs on firms.
For example, the opportunity cost of hiring a politically connected CEO or person-
nel, or nominating such members to the board, is the forgone contributions of others
who could have added value to the firm with their skills and expertise. The technical
and politically connected board members are at best imperfect substitutes. Hence,
a pertinent but so far unanswered question that occurs in this context is: what are
the determinants of the trade-off behind the formation of such connections? That is,
what are the incremental gains and costs faced by a firm that plans to forge political
connections? Important related questions are: if political ties end up intervening in
financial markets and institutions (as suggested by a large number of studies), how
do they affect their core activities such as monitoring, supervision and production of
information? Finally, are there any spill-over effects of such intervention in financial
1See ??; and ? for campaign financing and composition of directors and other key personnel
within firms.
2These papers consider the various forms of political connections in financial markets and bank-
ing institutions in a large number of countries in Asia, Europe and Americas.
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systems that impact the value of the borrowing firms?
While addressing these questions, the paper contributes to the literature by of-
fering new insights on the impact of political intervention on banks and financial
markets and also by providing new empirical implications for the economies where
the financial market is often subject to political influences. First, we establish that
politically motivated state intervention for bailing out the connected firms in times
of financial distress impair the banks’ and financial institutions’ abilities to produce
information used extensively in the process of selection and monitoring of borrowing
firms’ projects. The resulting reduction of substantive content of banks’ information
used for loan evaluation imposes costs on the overall economy because it gives rise to
a larger number of project failures, inefficient bankruptcies and fewer restructuring.
Such phenomena are likely to occur because banks invest time, resources and money
in acquiring information used in the process of granting loans to borrowers, monitor-
ing of their projects and pricing of loan. The production of information generated
in this process contributes to firm value and make bank loans special to alternative
means of financing. See classic studies by ? and ? on the special role of banks which
are followed by a host of studies like ??, and ? among others. However, bailing out
makes the loan partially secured and political “capital” of firm serves as intangible
collateral for bank loans. Feeling safer, banks lose incentives to gather information
about the likelihood of the bad state. Hence, the trade-off appears in equilibrium
where firms’ benefits from bail out is partially offset by the lower level of information
produced by banks.
Thus political connection, though helps the firms by offering a hedge against the
likelihood of poor cash flow, the trade-off imposes two types of costs in equilibrium:
1. Direct costs, consisting of the payment of fees, remuneration and benefits to
politically connected individuals who solicit for a bailout from the Government.
2. Indirect or hidden costs that are incurred when banks, being beneficiaries
from the borrowing firm’s political connections, lose incentives to produce informa-
tion valuable for the firm as well. The potential value-reduction from less effective
bank monitoring may represent an underexplored impact (i.e., a “hidden cost”) of
government involvement in the financial markets and may contribute to the broader
debate of the costs and benefits of state participation in economic activities.
Second, we show that this detrimental effect on bank’s bid to acquisition of
information varies negatively with (a) environments encouraging a greater political
interference in financial systems (b) degree of transparencies and norms of disclosure
requirements and (c) state of the economy.
To put it in perspective, the result (a) is directly related to economies where a
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greater percentage of banks is owned by the state. Since the goal of building political
connections is to ensure access to emergency financing (i.e., bailouts), a state owned
bank (SOB) can be more easily persuaded to make politically motivated loans than
would a private bank. Thus, our model predicts that political connections should be
more valuable in a country with a greater concentration of state ownership of banks.
As a result, such economies will experience a decline in the banking services. There
already exists a voluminous literature which show that SOBs are often used as a
“tool of redistributive politics” ( See ?) whereby the state intervenes either directly
or indirectly in pricing, disbursement and bailing out of loans on the basis of political
patronage. A series of related empirical studies also document that state owned banks
tend to be relatively more unprofitable and inefficient and often gets privatized as
those political gains tend to be outweighed by costs which often consist of (among
other elements) volume of bad loans disbursed parties with political connections. See
??? and ? among many others for widespread evidence of adverse impact from both
political and regulatory state intervention in SOB which are also consistent with
conclusions reached in the current paper.
Second, the degree of transparencies and norms of disclosure often determine costs
of gathering valuable information about the firm and its projects and opaqueness in
laws hampers bank’s efforts to collect such information. These factors introduce
greater uncertainty about the downside risk of a firm’s cash flow and encourage
firms to build up political connections to shield downside risks. Our result in (b)
is thus consistent with empirical findings of the related literature that show politi-
cal connections vary in legal regimes depending on the strength of disclosures and
transparencies. See ? and ? 3.
We also show that the political connections of firms and accompanying reduction
of information based lending get exacerbated by the standard agency problems in
firms where ownership is separated from control. Finally, we offer a new testable
implication that a bad state of the economy increases downside risk and encourages
more political activities that further deteriorates quality of bank’s information.
We derive these conclusions in a set up where (i) firms use political connections as
tools of insurance-cum-hedging which cushion the adverse shocks to their cash flows
and (ii) such connection also acts as an intangible collateral for the bank and makes
its loan more secured. The firms pay premiums (remunerations) to the connected
3By using a comprehensive dataset with 101 countries spanning 1982 to 2000, ? show that
political influences, legal regimes and falling efficiencies of banks are important determinants of
bank privatizations and thus in a way provide an indirect testimony to our conclusions regarding
bank’s reduced ability to produce information due to political interference.
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board members and personnel who, in turn, secure bailouts and other favors from
political network. The opportunity cost of this premium is the forgone services by
skilled directors/personnel and the marginal gain is the incremental probability of
receiving emergency funds from the Government.
Thus political connection in our model plays a role similar to hedging/insurance
cum diversification strategies routinely followed by firms to mitigate exposures to
business risk and uncertainty. See ??, Buhlmann (1970), ??. The price (wage rate
or other forms of remuneration) paid to the connected members acts like an insurance
premium which is equivalent to buying “political patronage” which enables firms to
reduce downside risk of business cash flows. A firm thus holds a diversified portfolio
of technical and political members and personnel and the latter group builds polit-
ical connection with the purpose of obtaining emergency funds in times of financial
distress. Viewed from this perspective, the function of political network replicates
diversification, hedging and related risk management strategies and this alterna-
tive route for managing risk is more likely to be observed in a greater frequency in
economies with undeveloped financial markets. The degree and strength of political
connectivity depend on the composition of the member of these two types (technical
and political members) which in turn depends on the relative costs and benefits like
the wage premium, probability of downside risk and magnitude of bailout.
Such insurance/hedging motive behind the formation of political connection also
makes this activity similar to investment where firm devotes resources in the current
period for entering into a (semi) durable political network for reaping benefits in
the future in times of distress. That is, a firm hires and pays politically connected
member/personnel before the resolution of uncertainty and its expected benefits arise
in the future in the form of favorable financing or bailouts if the firm encounters
financial hardship. This contingent benefit in the future in the form of an insurance
is the fruit of past investment made for building political connections.
This investment like feature embedded in insurance/hedging framework makes
our model different from other papers in the literature. The corporate political
activities may take many other forms like campaign financing, lobbying via a third
party etc. For discussion of these other forms of political activity and their impact
on the firm’s rates of return in political market, durability of such connections and
other related issues, see ??? and ?. Moreover, ? present evidence that campaign
contributions and lobbying expenditures do not lead to long-lasting benefits. They
show that value of a firm’s intangible capital represented by Tobin’s q (market to
book ratio) bear insignificant relationship to campaign contributions and lobbying
expenditure which directly suggests that political connections formed via these routes
are temporary and expenditures incurred in this process are often competed away and
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mostly they represent expenses but not investment. In the light of these findings, our
paper can be generalized by splitting the decision to buy political influence for short-
and long-run. The allocation of corporate fund for campaign /lobbying determines
short-term objectives and the funds earmarked for appointment of a connected BOD
(duration more than a year) can be considered as a forward looking investment4.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 below presents a benchmark model
without political connections that discusses the core banking functions of information
production, supervision, and firm value. Section 3 introduces political connections
to grasp their incremental effects and section 4 pinpoints the equilibrium effects of
political connections and advances propositions and empirical hypotheses. Section 5
concludes the paper
2. The Benchmark Model: No Political Connections
In our benchmark case, we have a bank/intermediary (lender) that collects infor-
mation and advances loans to a firm (borrower), partially secured by collateral. The
firm does not have a political connection in any form with which to bail itself out
of financial distress. The firm seeks a bank loan to invest in a risky project which
requires an investment (I). The main objective in this section is to examine the
bank’s incentives to gather information about the quality of the firm’s project and
its impact on firm value. The analysis of this benchmark case allows us to compare
the outcome to an environment where the bank’s incentives to gather information
about the firm’s project affects the latter’s bid to form political connections and vice
versa (see section 3).
There are three relevant time periods for the model {T0, T1 and T2}. The project
begins at (T0). The decisions to shut down or to continue the project taken at (T1) is
based on the information collected by the bank at that time. At (T2), uncertainty is
resolved and the project, if continued from the earlier phase, either succeeds or fails
and the pay-off is distributed between owners of the firm and the bank. The quality
of the project is uncertain at (T0) when it requires funding. At that time, it is known
that there are good and bad projects. A good project arrives with probability (e)5.
A good project always generates cash flow (y) with probability (Pr = 1) at (T2). A
bad or poorer quality project generates the same cash flow at that time but with a
4We are indebted to a referee for pointing out this short-run versus long-run view of political
connection.
5The term (e) captures the state of the economy or anything else which is beyond the firm’s
control.
lower probability of success, given by (0 ≤ sb < 1). The probability of arrival of the
inferior quality project is (1− e).
An inferior quality project thus fails with probability (1−sb) and, in that case, its
liquidation value at (T2) is (βL). The value of (β < 1) captures the bankruptcy costs
associated with delays and other frictions due to financial distress. Hence, without
additional information, at (T0), the expected net present value from a project is:
ey + [(1− e)(sby + (1− sb)βL)]− I.
The bank or intermediary monitors the project closely and, as a result, can receive
a “signal” at (T1) which conveys further information about its quality. The signal,
which could take either high or low value, respectively represents a good or bad
news about the project. If the news is bad, the decision is to discontinue the project
immediately and the salvage value of the terminated project at (T1) is (L < I).
We formulate the following assumptions:
I > L, and (A)
L > sby + (1− sb)βL, or
L[1− (1− sb)β] > sby (B)
The assumption made in (A) above suggests that investment in the project is
risky. The second assumption (B) indicates that additional information which con-
veys bad news is useful. The early detection of bad projects with a reliable and
timely information saves costs for the firm. Hence, the current liquidation value
exceeds the expected continuation value of the bad project. These two assumptions
open up the possibility of gathering information and monitoring of the project by a
financial intermediary6. Early detection helps in halting bad projects before it is too
late7.
The information structure used by the bank/intermediary is summarized by a
system of signals which transmit further information about the quality of the project.
If the true state of the world is ω ∈ {good , bad}, then signal σ ∈ {high, low} consists
of a probabilistic perception of the state described as follows:
6We assume that these information gathering activities are specifically an expertise of the bank
and not the firm. The banks, being informed lenders, acquire information about projects and
monitor them both directly and via imposing covenants. See ? and ? for special role of banks
followed by several works including ?? and ? for the information processing role of banks and
intermediaries.
7Liquidation may involve either sale or restructuring or even going to bankruptcy court (Chapter
7) for early liquidation.
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Pr .(σ = h | ω = G) = 1 and Pr .(σ = ℓ | ω = G) = 0
Pr .(σ = h | ω = B) = 1− λ and Pr .(σ = ℓ | ω = B) = λ
The structure of a signal is as such that the intermediary always receives high
signal (which means that the news is good) when the actual state is good. However,
the intermediary receives low signal (meaning bad news) with a probability of (λ)
when the state is bad. Thus, λ ∈ (1
2
, 1) measures precision of the signal and the
cost of acquiring the signal is ( bλ
2
2
) where (b) is a constant. The higher the value of
(λ), the greater is the value of the precision, signifying smaller error in perception of
the actual state of the world. However, it is costlier to obtain a signal with greater
precision. Thus banks choose an optimal precision of signal such that incremental
gains and costs are equal.
The intermediary thus provides the fund (I) needed to run the project at (T0) and
a manager runs it with the necessary input ( i.e. skill and labour). The intermediary
collects information at (T1), ensures the dissolution of the project when it receives low
signal. The bank allows the project to continue whenever it receives high signal. We
further assume that the intermediary/bank holds a partially secured debt contract,
so that if the project continues and fails, it receives (βL) at (T2). The pay-off is (L)
at (T1) if the project is discontinued.
Hence, the expected pay-off (πb) of the bank at (T0) is:
max
λ∈( 1
2
,1)
πb = [e+ (1− e)(1− λ)sb]Df
+ (1− e)[(1− λ)(1− sb)βL+ λL]
−
b
2
λ2 − I
(1)
The first term in the parenthesis captures the joint probability of a high signal
received by the bank and the success of the project. The firm pays back the bank
the face value of the loan Df . The second term captures two scenarios: One: the
bank receives a high signal and the project continues but fails with the probability
(1 − e)(1 − λ)(1 − sb), it recovers a salvage of βL. Two: the bank receives a low
signal when the project is bad, which occurs with probability (1−e)λ. The project is
immediately liquidated at (T1) and the bank, being the senior and secured creditor,
receives (L).
The bank optimally chooses the precision of the signal, (λ), to maximize its
expected profit expressed in equation (1). The first order condition for the problem
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is:
(1− e)[L− sbDf − (1− sb)βL] = λb (2)
The left hand side of (2) represents the marginal gains from acquiring more precise
signals. The incremental benefit for acquiring such a signal of greater strength is the
pay-off from early liquidation, as opposed to the expected pay-off sbDf − (1− sb)βL
in case of continuation of a bad project. The marginal cost of investing in better
information technology is (λb), captured by the right hand side of the same equation.
We make the following additional observations:
(i) If the left hand side (1−e)[L−sbDf−(1−sb)βL] is smaller than the right hand
side (λb) for all possible values of (λ), then the minimum value of precision of
the signal is (1
2
≡ λ0). If the inequality holds in the reverse, then the precision
attains its maximum value of 1.
(ii) The optimal precision of the signal acquired by the bank will depend on
bankruptcy costs (β), the state of the economy (e) and the level of trans-
parency in acquiring degrees of reliable information, captured by the cost (b).
It is clear from equation (2) that the optimal acquisition of precision of signals
will also depend on the face value of the loan, (Df ), which is also an endogenous
variable. We add the zero expected profit condition for competitive banks and,
together with the first-order condition in (2), they jointly determine the optimal
value of the precision of signal and the face value of the loan. This is summarized
by the proposition 1 below:
Proposition 1. The optimal precision of signal and the face value of debt D∗f are
given by: λ∗ = (1 − e)
[
L−sbDf−(1−sb)βL
b
]
and [e + (1 − e)sb]D
∗
f +
b
2
λ∗2 = I − (1 −
e)(1− sb)βL.
Proposition 2. (a) The firm value
πf = [e+ (1− e)sb]y + (1− e)(1− sb)βL−
b
2
λ∗2 + λ∗(1− e)[L− sby − (1− sb)βL]
And the incremental firm value due to acquisition of signal by banks is captured by the
last two terms. - b
2
λ∗2+λ∗(1− e)[L− sby− (1− sb)βL], which is the net incremental
gain from information based restructuring L rather than continuing that yields a
value sby + (1− sb)βL
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3. Political Connections and Financial Markets
This section incorporates political connections in the aforementioned framework
to examine their impact on banks’ incentive to gather information and the conse-
quences for the firm value. The firm spends resources to form political connections
in anticipation of direct intervention from the Government in the event of project
failure and firm bankruptcy. The resources spent take the form of employing either
politically connected individuals who sit on the board or in various committees for
advising and supervision of the project. In other words, the firm in our model buys
services of politicians or politically connected individuals who could influence the
probability of receiving bailout from the Government if the project fails.
To be specific, a bailout occurs when the firm receives an amount (x) from the
Government in the event of business failure. This happens when the banks receive
high signal but the selected project is of inferior quality and fails with a probability
of (1 − sb)
8. The probability of obtaining this bailout fund (x) under these circum-
stances depends on the fraction of politically connected members working in the firm.
If the fraction (t) of such personnel is politically connected, then the probability of
obtaining the government bailout fund is given by the function (f(t) = atγ). Where
(a > 0) and (1 > γ > 0) are constants and indicators of political strength, environ-
ment etc. Note that when (f(0) = 0) as done in the preceding section, it suggests
that - without any political connection - the probability of receiving a bailout fund
is zero 9.
The political connection itself is a “risky asset” because, with the complementary
probability (1 − atγ), the firm may not be able to obtain a bailout10. Secondly,
adding an extra politically connected member to the firm’s management team helps
because (f /(t) = aγtγ−1 > 0). However, the incremental probability of obtaining
bailout fund declines with addition of extra politically connected people to the firm
as (f //(t) = aγ(γ − 1)tγ−1 < 0).
We must note that there are differential effects of political connections in dissim-
ilar environment which can be captured by the term a For example, as mentioned
8We omit the discussion of how the Government taxes other firms and costs associated with such
transfers. The issues are important but we want to focus on the incentives to acquire information
and firm value.
9The assumption is not crucial. We can add an exogenous probability of receiving the bail out
fund and this will not change any results
10We treat the effectiveness of political connections probabilistically, as is could be rendered
ineffective by various factors such as negative media coverage or the government being voted out of
power or connected BOD fails to perform according to expectation of the firm etc. See for example
? and ?.
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in the introduction that empirical studies indicate that political intervention is more
likely to occur in an economy dominated by the state owned banks (SOB) and we can
capture the phenomenon with assumption as > ans, where subscripts s and ns stand
for SOBs and non- SOBs. We must note that differential economic environments
affect returns to political connections as f /(a) = tγ > 0
As before, the firm issues debt to finance the project and debt holders charge a
face value of (Dp), which is repaid by the firm in the event of success of the project.
If the project fails and the political connection succeeds, then the firm receives an
amount (x), in the form of Government bailout and this happens with the probability
(atγ). In this case, the firm and its debt holders bargain for a share of the total pie
(x+ βL). We assume that the firm obtains (α) and the bank receives (1− α) of the
total pie11. The firm does not receive any bailout with a complementary probability
of (1− atγ) and the debt holders receive the salvage value (βL). This is in fact the
amount they would receive when there is no such connections.
The politically connected individuals in the firm receive (wp) and the rest (non-
politically connected members) receive (wn). We assume that these remunerations
are determined by the market for politically connected individuals. With this set-up,
the firm’s expected pay-off is:
πfp = [e+ (1− e)(1− λ)sb](y −Dp)
+ (1− e)(1− λ)(1− sb)[αat
γ(βL+ x)]
− wpt− wn(1− t)
(3)
To recapitulate, atγ = Political lobbying function; y = cash flow in the event of
success; L = liquidation value of the project in the event of failure; e = Probability
of arrival of a good project; Dp = face value of the loan; wp = remuneration of
politically connected directors; wn = remunerations of the non-politically connected
persons and I = investment for the project. The subscript “p” in a variable signifies
its value in a politically connected firm in the rest of the paper.
If the lenders charge a face value of Dp. their expected pay-off function is:
11We omit the process of division of the total cash flow (βL+x) between the firm and its debtors
and assume that (α) is exogenous. However, the model could be expanded in that direction without
substantial changes in the result of the paper.
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πbp = [e+ (1− e)(1− λ)sb]Dp
+ (1− e)
[
[λL+ (1− λ)(1− sb){at
γ(1− α)(βL+ x) + (1− atγ)βL}]
]
−
b
2
λ2 − I
(4)
The first terms collected within the square brackets are exactly the same as before
and thus need no further explanations12. The last terms in equations (3) and (4) are
new and need explanations. If the selected bad project continues upon the receipt
of bank’s high signal, the probability of failure is (1− e)(1− λ)(1− sb), so that the
firm or the bank files for bankruptcy, then either one of the following two mutually
exclusive states occur:
1. The political connection succeeds with probability (atγ), the firm and the bank
respectively share (α) and (1− α) of the total pie, (βL+ x).
2. The political connection fails with complementary probability and the bank
receives (βL) but the firm receives nothing as the ’absolute priority rule (APR)
kicks in.
Finally, if the bank receives low signal when the project is bad, it receives the full
liquidation value of the project, (L)13. The Bank chooses (λ) to maximize expected
pay-off. Hence,
max
λ∈( 1
2
,1)
πbp = [e+ (1− e)(1− λ)sb]Dp
+ (1− e)
[
λL+ (1− λ)(1− sb){at
γ(1− α)(βL+ x) + (1− atγ)βL
]
−
b
2
λ2 − I
(5)
Equation (5) captures the link between political connection of the firms and their
financiers” expected payoffs. For example, the greater the strength of the politi-
cal connection (measured by a), or the greater the fraction of politically connected
12This is due to our assumption that political connections are redundant in the event of success
or of liquidation of the project based on early information.
13Note when the project continues and fails in the next time period, the bank receives βL.,
However, if the project continues and fails, an immediate liquidation generates (L > βL) for the
bank.
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individuals/directors ( measured by t), the more secured is the debt, as the bank
recovers a higher fraction of the debt even if the firm is bankrupt. Therefore, polit-
ical connections of firms directly impact the bank’s optimal choice of the degree of
precision of signals. This is reflected in the first order condition below:
(1− e)[L− sbDp − (1− sb){βL+ at
γx(1− α)− atγαβL}] = λpb (2A)
Comparing the above equation (2A) with (2) in page 9 (benchmark model), we
observe that the political influence (atγ) affects optimal acquisition of information,
as it enters directly in the first-order condition. It also reduces optimal precision of
signal if the bank’s incremental gains from a firm’s political connections is positive.
Proposition 3 below summarizes this effect on the optimal precision of the signal
acquired by banks.
Proposition 3. The political connection of firms will reduce the optimal degree of
precision of the signal compared to its absence if (1−α)x > αβL , that is, creditors’
pay-off from the political bailout exceeds the same with its absence.
A direct comparison between equations (2A) and (2) establish the results in
Proposition 3. If the firm does not employ any politically connected individuals
(t = 0), the first-order condition above coincides with the same in (2). We assume
the inequality (1−α)x > αβL holds in the rest of the analysis. The condition states
that bank’s share of the bail out fund exceeds the amount it loses out to the firm’s
shareholders from the salvage value of the project (αβL)14.
We can conclude that (i) political connection of firms leads to a fall in the precision
of information acquired by banks and (ii) the loss of incremental precision of the
signal is maximum for (t = 1). The intuitive reason is that “political connections” of
firms act as an “intangible collateral” and tend to make debt more secured in the case
of bankruptcy. Hence the probability that the bank may lose the incentive to gather
valuable information about downside risk, captured by a decline in (λ) and (iii) the
degree and the magnitude of information loss will be higher in economies dominated
by the SOBs where (as discussed before) it is more likely that the inequality as > ans
might hold true. Finally, it is evident from (2A) that optimal precision of the signal
(λp) acquired by the bank also directly depends on the degree of political connections
14The assumption is that banks participate in the bailout programme to share the pie, otherwise
as senior creditors, they might veto against such activities.
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of the firm (t). Next we turn to the analysis of the firm’s trade-off that determines
the degree of political connections.
3.1. Firm’s Political Connections:
When a firm chooses the optimal level of political connection, (t) it takes
(i) the degree of information precision acquired by the bank (λp) to be given.
(ii) (Dp) to be such that the bank makes a break-even. Thus, firm’s expected
pay-off is:
πfp = [e+ (1− e)(1− λ)sb](y −Dp)
+ (1− e)(1− λ)(1− sb)[αat
γ(x+ βL]− wpt− wn(1− t)
(6)
By inserting (Dp) from the zero expected profit of the bank (i.e. setting the
equation (4) equal to zero), into equation (6) above, we obtain the expected profit
of the firm (7) and the firm now chooses (t) to maximize the expected pay-off:15
max
{t}
πfp = [e+ (1− e)(1− λ)sb]y
+ (1− e)[λL+ (1− λ)(1− sb){at
γx+ βL}]
− wpt− wn(1− t)
(7)
and the first-order condition is:
t : (1− e)(1− λ)(1− sb)aγt
γ−1x− (wp − wn) = 0 (8)
Equation (8) apparently captures the similarity between “hedging” and political
connections. If the firm becomes financially distressed, which occurs with probabil-
ity (1− e)(1− λ)(1− sb) replacing a non-politically connected person with someone
connected increases the probability of bailout (of receiving x) by aγtγ−1x. However it
incurs an extra cost of (wp−wn) for buying “political patronage” . At the optimum
both should be equal.
15It can be noted that the model and the firm’s expected pay-off (given in equation (7)) concides
with the benchmark model of the section 2 without political connection with t = 0, i.e., when the
firm does not have a politically cnnected member in either BOD or in payroll.
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Hence, t∗ =
(
(1−e)(1−λ)(1−sb)γax
(wp−wn)
) 1
1−γ
and the probability of receiving bail out via
politically connected board member is: at∗γ =
(
((1−e)(1−λ)(1−sb)γax
(wp−wn)
) γ
1−γ
.
For simplicity, we will be working with γ = 1
2
for the clarity of the exposition, in
which case, t∗ =
(
(1−e)(1−λ)(1−sb))a
x
2
(wp−wn)
)2
and at∗
1
2 = a
(
(1−e)(1−λ)(1−sb)a
x
2
(wp−wn)
)
Proposition 4. (i) The incremental firm value attributed to political connection for
the case γ0 =
1
2
is
(1− e)(1− λ)(1− sb)at
∗γx− t∗(wp − wn) =
(
(1− e)(1− λ)(1− sb)a
x
2
(wp − wn)
)2
(ii) The firm tends to employ a greater fraction of politically connected individuals
in response to a larger bailout fund and the fraction tends to increase with the strength
of the political connection (a), but decreases with a relative rise in the compensations
of the politically connected individuals vis-a-vis non connected members (wp − wn).
4. Equilibrium: The value of the Firm and Political Connections
The Proposition 4, above shows that the firm’s optimal political connectivity
t∗, depends on bank’s acquisition of informtion given by the precision of the signal
(λp). Similarly, proposition 3 shows the optimal precision of the signal acquired by
the bank also explicitly depends on the firm’s political connections atγ. Intuitively,
an increased strength of political connections of the firm will reduce the optimal
precision of banks’ signal because the loan is now more secured due to the possibility
of a bailout. In a similar way, a lower precision of bank’s signal, as the proposition
4 shows will increase the firm’s optimal level of political ties. A lower precision
of the signal will make banks mistake the low quality project for a high quality one
more frequently. The firm will thus experience more project failures and bankruptcies
which make the political connections more profitable. The upshot of the propositions
3 and 4 is that the optimal selection of precision of the bank’s signal and the optimal
political connections of the firm are interdependent and thus they are determined in
Nash equilibrium.
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Proposition 5 below resolves the interdependence between λ∗p, D
∗
p, t
∗. Proposition
6 expresses the equilibrium value of the firm as a function of banks information
precision and firms degree of political connection.
Proposition 5. The tuple {λ∗p, D
∗
p, t
∗} get determined by (i) the bank’s zero expected
profit condition, (ii) optimal degree of precision of signal acquired by the bank, and
(iii) firm’s optimum level of political connections. The conditions are fulfilled by the
following sets of equations.
[e+ (1− e)sb]Dp +
b
2
λ∗2p + (1− e)(1− sb)[βL+ (1− λ
∗
p)Z]− I = 0
(1− e)[L− sbDp − (1− sb){βL+ (1− λ
∗
p)Z}]− λ
∗
pb = 0
and
t∗ =
(
(1− e)(1− λ)(1− sb)a
x
2
(wp − wn)
)2
Where Z = {x(1 − α) − αβL
x
}
(
(1−e)(1−sb)
1
2
(ax)
(wp−wn)
)2
is a positive number given the
parameters.
Proposition 6. The corresponding equilibrium firm value πfp is:
[e+ (1− e)sb]y + (1− e)(1− sb)βL
+ (1− e)λ∗p
[
L− sby − (1− sb)βL
]
− b
λ∗2p
2
+ (1− λ∗b)
2 1
2(wp − wn)
[
(1− e)(1− sb)ax
]2
5. Discussions and Empirical Implications
Propositions 5 and 6 outline the optimal determination of political connections
of the firm and the degree of information acquisition of banks, as well as their com-
bined impact on equilibrium firm value. Proposition 5 shows that optimal precision
of bank’s signal, face value of its loan and political connections of the firm are deter-
mined simultaneously. We formulate these relationships as functions of deep param-
eters such as costs of information acquisition (b), the strength of political connections
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(a) and the state of the economy (1− e). That is, a country’s corporate governance
laws on information disclosures, political atmosphere (e.g., predominance of SOBs)
and the state of overall economic condition decisively determine i) the extent of firm’s
political connections, ii) banks’ pay-off, iii) supervision and monitoring technology.
iv) and finally, their collective impact on the firm value. For example, opaque laws of
disclosures for firms or a non-transparent accounting system in a country will raise
the banks’ cost of acquisition of information (b) about the state of firm’s projects.
This will result in a lower value of λ∗p (can be observed from the equation (2A)) As a
consequence, it is more likely that bad projects will continue and not be liquidated.
The increased likelihood of an unfavorable scenario (stemming from a higher cost
of information acquisition (b)) thus makes the expected pay-off from incremental
political connections greater from the firm’s point of view, which can be directly
inferred from expression for t∗. Thus, the trade-off between information-based mon-
itoring of the project (i.e. acquiring a better signal) and political connection will
tilt in the favour of the latter in a country with weak disclosure laws and lack of
transparencies.
Similarly, an increased premium paid to the politically connected agents, mea-
sured by a larger magnitude (wp−wn) (in economies where the connected individuals
are scarce), would make the incremental costs of political connections larger and will
prompt the firm to spend less resources in building up such links. This, in turn,
will lower the probability of obtaining bailout funds and result in a lower pay-off in
bankruptcy for both firms and the banks and would make loans less collateralized
and secure. This will encourage banks to invest further resources to obtain more
precise signal resulting in a higher (λ∗p). Thus, a higher premium paid to politi-
cally connected persons moves the trade-off more towards information-based bank
supervision and monitoring.
We presented substantial empirical evidence that political connections tend to
be more frequent in economies dominated by the SOBs. In the parlance of our
framework, this will translate into a higher value of (a) which implies that the con-
nection tends to be stronger for a given composition of BOD (t) for such economies.
It can be directly seen from the equation (8) that the marginal value of political
connections will be larger, leading to a higher composition of politically connected
BOD/personnel and will result in a greater value of t∗ and at∗
1
2
.. This will result in
lower precision of signal acquired by the bank as can be seen from equation (2A).
Hence, state intervention in the banking system will move the trade-off towards more
political connections and lesser quality of banking services.
The extent of political connections and information-based monitoring in equi-
librium also depends on the state of the economy captured by the term (1 − e).
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If the state of the economy is poor, it implies that the probability of arrival of a
poorer quality project is higher. Accordingly, a better and precise information has a
greater incremental value for the bank which will further invest to acquire error-proof
technology for monitoring firms. However, the impact on the firm’s investment in
political connection in anticipation of a poor state of the economy tends to be am-
biguous. The likelihood of worse prospects for the economy increases the incremental
value of hedging via political connections. On the other hand, the bank’s increased
bid to acquire a more precise signal leads to the greater possibility of liquidation
of projects, which in turn discourages the firm to investing in building up political
connections. The equilibrium political connections, in this case, will depend on the
relative strength of the two opposing effects.
The empirical predictions made so far from the equilibrium analysis of the model
can be directly interpreted and analyzed by putting Propositions 5 and 6 together.
The propositions succinctly capture the inverse relation between the degree of polit-
ical connections of firms and information-based supervision by banks, which is the
central theme of the paper. The proposition 6 breaks down firm value into three
components: (i) The first term in the expression are NPV of the project (ii) the
second term L− sby− (1− sb)βL−
bλ∗2p
2
is the bank’s incremental net contribution to
firm value from supervision and monitoring technology through a better information
precision.
The last term captures the firm value attributed to political connections. The ex-
pression in proposition 6 highlights two important features which convey the essence
of the paper: First, it can seen that while the magnitude from bank’s contributions to
the firm’s NPV are multiplied by λ∗p, the same component from political contribution
is weighed by (1 − λ∗p)
2. Since the proposition 3 establishes that λ∗p < λ
∗, we con-
clude that the political sources form greater part of the value of the connected firms
and bank’s contribution to incremental firm value declines as a consequence. This
signifies the trade-off between quality of banks’ services and political intervention in
financial markets as the former displaces information based bank lending. Second, a
marginal decline in the strength of signal magnifies the impact on the effectiveness
of political connectivity implying that trade-off is much more pronounced at a lower
level of bank’s information-based lending activities.
Thus, combining proposition 5 and 6 together, we find that the incremental firm
value places weight of (λ∗p) to information-based supervision. However, it places a
greater weight (1−λ∗p)
2 on political connections. Where, λ∗p depends on fundamentals
such as costs of acquisitions of information (b), state’s ownership role in banking,
costs of political connections (wp−wn), and the state of the economy, (1− e). Based
on the discussion of the implications of these two propositions, we can summarize
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our empirical predictions in the form of following hypotheses:16:
1. The larger the costs of acquiring information, (b) (resulting from weak disclo-
sure laws), the lower the precision of signal. The bank’s signal is less informative
and the firm will tend to have a higher degree of political connection.
2. The greater the state invention in the overall financial system, the larger the
strength of the political connections, the lower the precision of the bank’s signal.
This hypothesis captures the hidden costs of strength of political ties likely to
be observed in economies with state ownership of banks.
3. The tighter the economic condition, the higher the quality of bank monitoring
on firms. The impact on the political connections of firms is ambiguous.
4. The lower the premium paid to the connected individuals, the larger the po-
litical connections and the smaller is the value of banks’ signal, signifying the
greater contribution of the former towards the firm value.
6. Conclusion
Political connections are almost ubiquitous. However, their origins and the causes
of their appearance vary across economies and countries, depending on the a coun-
try’s economic, political and legal settings. We have shown that hedging and enhanc-
ing the collateral value of its loan motivate the firm to form political connections. It
also comes at a cost in the form of slackening banks’ information-based oversight of
firms’ projects. We demonstrated that such a trade-off would vary across different
economic states, political and legal circumstances and have advanced hypotheses for
testing the differential impacts on the emergence of political connections in financial
markets and their effects on firm value. As a policy implication, the paper issues
an advisory warning against bank nationalization which is quite popular in many
emerging markets as means to enhance social welfare and banking stability. A major
conclusion obtained in the paper is that such decisions often impose hidden costs on
the economy which impair banks’ core functions of information acquisition and may
outweigh any possible gains.
The model is simple yet general and straightforward enough to extend our results
to the most interesting cases such as the relationship between political connections
and firm’s incentive to boost effort or private gains of its owners. It would also be
16In the appendix B, we prove hypothesis 1. We omit the proof of the other hypotheses in the
text as they are the replicate one another. However, proof can be obtained upon the request from
the author.
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interesting to examine the role of competition among firms impact in formation of
political connections. In our future research, we plan to address these problems and
issues in greater detail.
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APPENDIX A
Proof. (Proposition 1) The equilibrium must satisfy the bank’s expected zero
profit condition is
[e+ (1− e)(1− λ∗)sb]Df
+ (1− e)[λ∗L+ (1− λ∗)(1− sb)βL
−
b
2
λ∗2 − I = 0
(A.1)
and the bank’s optimality conditions for the choice of λ:
(1− e)[L− SbDf − (1− sb)βL] = λ
∗b (A.2)
Rewriting equation (A.1), we get:
[e+ (1− e)]Df
+ (1− e)λ∗[L− sbDf − (1− sb)βL]
+ (1− e)(1− sb)βL−
b
2
λ∗2 − I = 0
Using (A.2) in the above expression, we get:
[e+ (1− e)]Df +
b
2
λ∗2 − I − (1− e)(1− sb)βL = 0 (A.3)
Proof. (Proposition 2) By inserting the value of Df from above equation into,
firm’s expected profit yields: πf = [e + (1 − e)sb]y + (1 − e)(1 − sb)βL +
b
2
λ∗2 −
λ∗sb(1− e)(y −D
∗
f )
Proof. (Proposition 3) The firm’s expected profit is:
πfp = [e+ (1− e)sb](y −Dp)
+ (1− e)(1− λ)(1− sb)at
γα{βL+ x}
− wpt− wn(1− t)
(A.4)
The expected profit of the bank is:
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πbp = [e+ (1− e)(1− λ)sb]Dp
+ (1− e)[λL+ (1− λ)(1− sb){x(1− α)at
γ − αβLatγ}]
−
b
2
λ2 − I
(A.5)
Setting the expected profit of the competitive banks equal to zero and plugging the
resultant value of Dp into (A.4), we get the firm’s expected pay-off as:
πfp = [e+ (1− e)(1− λ)sb]y −
b
2
λ2
+ (1− e)[λL+ {(1− λ)(1− sb)(βL+ at
γx)}]− twp − (1− t)wn
(A.6)
Maximizing (A.6) with respect to t yields:
t∗ =
(
(1− e)(1− λ)(1− sb)γax
(wp − wn)
) 1
1−γ
Using γ = 1
2
in the above expression, we get the expression for t∗ in the proposi-
tion, t∗ =
(
(1−e)(1−λ)(1−sb)a
x
2
(wp−wn)
)2
and at
1
2 = a
(
(1−e)(1−λ)(1−sb)a
x
2
(wp−wn)
)
Proof. (Proposition 5) Equilibrium: Equilibrium in the model consists of a tuple
{D∗p, λ
∗
p, t
∗} such that (i) the firm’s expected pay-off is at a maximum, (ii) the bank
has obtained an optimal degree of precision of precision of signal, (iii) the competitive
banks earn zero profit in expectations. As shown in the body of the paper, that for a
given level of (Dp) and (t), the banks choose the optimal degree of precision of signal
(λ∗p) to maximize their expected pay-off in (A.5) and the corresponding first-order
condition rewritten here below:
(1− e)[L− sbDp − (1− sb){βL+ (1− λ
∗
p)Z}]− λ
∗
pb = 0 (A.7)
and from proposition 3 t∗ =
(
(1−e)(1−λ)(1−sb)a
x
2
(wp−wn)
)2
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Next, rewriting (A.5) as
πbp = [e+ (1− e)sb]Dp
+ (1− e)λ[L− sbDp − (1− sb){βL+ at
γx(1− α)− αatγβL}]
+ (1− e)(1− sb){βL+ at
γx(1− α)− αatγβL} −
b
2
λ2 − I
and then by using the λ∗p from (A.7), we have
[e+ (1− e)sb]Dp +
b
2
λ∗2p
+ (1− e)(1− sb)[βL+ at
γ{x(1− α)− αβL}]− I = 0
Finally using γ = 1
2
and the expression at
1
2 from proposition 3, we obtain:
[e+ (1− e)sb]Dp +
b
2
λ∗2p + (1− e)(1− sb[βL+ (1− λ
∗
p)Z − I = 0 (A.8)
Where Z = {x(1− α)− αβL
x
}
(
(1−e)(1−sb)
1
2
(ax)
(wp−wn)
)2
Similarly, (A.7) can be written after using proposition (3) as:
(1− e)L− (1− e)sbDp − (1− e)(1− sb)βL+ (1− λ
∗
p)Z − λ
∗
pb = 0 (A.9)
and from proposition 3
t∗ =
(
(1− e)(1− λ∗p)(1− sb)a
x
2
(wp − wn)
)2
(A.10)
The tuple D∗p, λ
∗
p, t
∗ is determined by the solution to system of equations given in
(A.8) - (A.10). Where Z = x{(1− α)− αβL
x
}
(
(1−e)(1−sb)
1
2
(ax)
(wp−wn)
)2
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APPENDIX B
The tuple D∗p, λ
∗
p, t
∗ is determined by the solution to system of equations given
in (A.8)-(A.10) in proposition 5 of Appendix A. By implicitly differentiating these
equations with respect to firm value with respect to b, we find:
−(1− e)sb
dDp
db
− [b− Z]
dλ∗p
db
= λ∗p
[
e+ (1− e)sb
]dDp
db
+
[
λ∗pb− Z
]dλ∗p
db
=
λ∗2p
2
Solving implicitly these two equations, we get:
λ∗p
db
=
λ∗pe+ (1− e)sb
(
1−
λ∗p
2
)
∆
< 0 (B.1)
dDp
db
=
b
λ∗2p
2
+
(
1−
λ∗p
2
)
Zλ∗p
∆
> 0 (B.2)
Where
∆ = (Z − b)[e+ (1− e)sb] + (bλ
∗
p − Z)(1− e)sb
= −b(1− e)sb(1− λ
∗
p) + e[Z − b] < 0
(B.3)
and
Z = {x(1− α)− αβL}
[
(1− e)(1− sb)
1
2
(ax)
(wp − wn)
]2
(B.4)
Impact on the incremental firm value: The equilibrium incremental firm value as
given in Proposition 6 is rewritten below.
πfp = [e+ (1− e)sb]y + (1− e)(1− sb)βL
+ (1− e)λ∗p
[
L− sby − (1− sb)βL
]
− b
λ∗2p
2
+ (1− λ∗b)
2 1
2(wp − wn)
[
(1− e)(1− sb)ax
]2
(B.5)
The impact of a change in the costs of acquiring a more precise signal is given by
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the following expression.
dπfp
db
=
[
{L− spy − (1− sb)βL− λ
∗
p} −
1− λ∗p
wp − wn
{(1− e)(1− sb)ax}
2
]dλ∗p
db
(B.6)
The first term inside the bracket, {L− spy + (1− sb)βL} is the incremental gain
from added information and is positive from the condition (A) in the first section of
the paper. The second term is the incremental gains from political connection ( as
shown in the proposition 6). Since
dλ∗p
db
< 0, the sign of
dpifp
db
will depend on whether
“political connections” effect dominates the “information gathering” effects of banks.
The other hypothesis can be proved with the similar methods and reasoning. For
example, the hypothesis 2 which highlights the possible political impact of the state
ownership on the precision of bank’s signal. Following the same method, it can be
shown that
dλ∗p
da
=
dZ
da
e
∆
< 0.
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